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About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of critical 
importance to the acquisition profession.  A working paper is a forum to accomplish a 
variety of objectives such as: (1) present a rough draft of a particular piece of acquisition 
research, (2) structure a “white paper” to present opinion or reasoning, (3) put down 
one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for collegial review, (4) present a preliminary draft of an 
eventual article in an acquisition periodical, (5) provide a tutorial (such as a technical 
note) to accompany a case study, and (6) develop a dialogue among practitioners and 
researchers that encourages debate and discussion on topics of mutual importance.     
A working paper is generally the “internal” outlet for academic and research institutions 
to cultivate an idea, argument or hypothesis, particularly when in its infant stages.  The 
primary intent is to induce critical thinking about crucial acquisition issues/problems that 
will become part of the acquisition professional body of knowledge.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be published 
in other venues such as articles in refereed journals and other periodicals, as technical 
reports, as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, or a variety of 
other similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories and principles will be 
challenged, examined and articulated.
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Reliability isn’t everything; it is the only thing! 
At the present time, the most serious problem in logistics support for the life of a 
weapon system is the asymmetry of the demonstrated reliability of components and the 
inventory and maintenance infrastructure necessary to match that reliability.  
Reliability is the single most dominant life cycle cost driver and is the key enabler of 
acceptable cost effective operational availability.  The greater the time between failures 
of components, the less we require expensive maintenance, critical test equipment, 
unique training and high priced inventories as well as other logistics elements.  The 
DoD and the Navy are struggling with the results of the imbalance of poor inherent 
reliability of components on the one hand, and the consequences of highly exaggerated 
reliability figures of merit used for life cycle support planning on the other.  The DoD and 
the Navy have not understood the results of a continuing failure to properly acquire, 
measure, manage and support demonstrated reliability.  We simply have too many 
demands for too few spare parts because of this asymmetry. 
For the sake of a common reference, let’s define reliability.  Reliability is comprised of 
four components:  probability, satisfactory performance, time, and specified operating 
conditions.  Taking these four elements together, we define reliability as the probability 
that a system, component, or part will operate satisfactorily for a specified period of time 
under specified operating conditions.  
Probability in this definition refers to a quantitative expression representing a percent 
specifying the number of hours we can expect a system to operate satisfactorily when 
we operate it.  For example, if we state that the probability of satisfactory performance 
for a hydraulic actuator for 100 hours is .8, then we can expect the system to survive 
100 hours 80% of the time.  In an inventory of like hydraulic actuators we can expect the 
same probability of survival, but experience shows us that failures will occur at different 
times in a probabilistic manner. 
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Satisfactory performance relates to the specific criteria, which describes proper 
performance, i.e. operate a trailing edge flap when a control input is made. 
Time is the key consideration when referring to reliability. Time is how we measure the 
probability of completing a mission or how often we have to do maintenance or gauging 
satisfactory performance with respect to time for spares inventory-planning purposes. 
We commonly define reliability in terms of mean time between failure (MTBF), mean 
time between maintenance, (MTBM) and mean time to failure, (MTTF).  It follows that 
the more frequent the failures, the greater the number of spares required as well as 
increased requirements for all the other logistics elements.   
Specified operating conditions define the way a system or component will be used, 
the environment it will be used in, and includes storage, packaging, handling and 
transportation.  
The qualities of each of the four elements of reliability result from a design-requirement 
synergy.  The resulting reliability is an inherent quality of that design.  That design 
produces a component that has a physically constrained reliability; an inherent reliability 
that is the best we can achieve in an ideal operating and maintenance environment.  
I have heard maintenance officers say that they can improve the reliability of a 
component by improving the maintenance.  That simply is not possible for the reason I 
just stated.  In 1982 I participated in a study at NAVAIR that showed that the only way to 
improve the inherent reliability of a system is to change the technology or physical 
construct of that system.  The inertial platform that was used in the A-6E is a good 
example of this concept.  Initially, the platform consisted of 3 mechanical gyros, one 
each for the X, Y, and Z axes with MTBFs in the low two-digits and in its final 
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Some additional reliability measures to consider: 
Failure rate        λ= number of failures 
      Total operating hours 
MTBF =   1 
                λ 
For illustrative purposes we will assume a reliability function in terms of a Poisson 
distribution thus reliability or the probability of survival is expressed as 
R(t) = e-Kλt 
Where R is reliability 
e is the natural log base (2.7182) 
K is the number of items used of a particular type 
λ is the failure rate (1/MTBF) 
t is the time period of interest 
Some factors related to reliability to consider: 
Inherent availability- is the probability that a system when used under specified 
conditions in an ideal environment (i.e. specified operating conditions, properly trained 
technicians, spares at the ready, tools etc.) will operate satisfactorily at any time 
required.  This definition excludes scheduled maintenance, logistics delay time, and 
administrative delay time. 
 
 
Where MTBF is the mean time between failure and           is the mean corrective 
maintenance time or mean time to repair. 
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Achieved availability- is the probability that a system operated and supported under 
specified conditions in an ideal support environment as above will perform as required 
at any time.   Achieved availability includes scheduled maintenance but excludes 
logistics delay time and administrative delay time. 
 
Where MTBM is the mean time between maintenance and       is the mean active 
maintenance time. 
Operational availability-  is the probability that a system when used under specified 
conditions in an actual operational environment will operate satisfactorily when required.   
The expression is -     Ao =  MTBM 
 MTBM + MDT 
Where MTBM is as above and MDT is the mean maintenance down time.   The 
reciprocal of MTBM is the frequency of maintenance that includes scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance.  The mean time between unscheduled maintenance should 
be ~ MTBF.  
Spare part quantity determination is a function of a probability of having a spare part 
when needed, the reliability of the item in question and the quantity of items used in 
the system.  (It is significant to point out that the F/A-18 item manager at NAVICP is 
using MTBD, meantime between demands, for inventory determination that in 








P = the probability of having a spare of a particular item available when required 
S = the number of spare parts carried in stock 
R = composite reliability as stated above 
K = quantity of parts used of a particular type 
lnR = natural logarithm of R 
Now that we have common references, let’s examine the concerns about properly 
acquiring, measuring and managing reliability figures of merit as the key parameter of 
providing life cycle support. 
First, we will consider how we acquire a reliability figure of merit for a component.   
Typically, a vendor will submit a reliability measure based on testing, estimates, 
expected reliability growth etc.  Since operational Test and Evaluation is expensive and 
focuses on systems rather than individual components, component unreliability may go 
unexposed.    For the lack of any other data the logistics managers tend to accept the 
contractor’s claim of X hours MTBF.  (It is noted here that with a paucity of data, it would 
serve us well to examine the history of performance of like items already in service 
being used in a similar way)  Based on that reliability figure of merit, it is then applied to 
our spare part quantity calculation that yields the number of spares we should carry.   
(for illustration purposes, we are ignoring component cost, operational scenario etc.) 
As an example we will consider the Trailing Edge Flap Actuator (TEF) for the F/A-18 A-
D.  In establishing initial support for the TEF we set its reliability figure of merit at 4000 
(According to NAVAIR APML circa 1997) hours mean time between failure.    From the 
above we show that the failure rate is .0025 in this case.  Now let’s assume we have an 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 6 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
airplane inventory of 200 airplanes, each of which is to operate 30 hours per month and 
we replenish stock every 90 days.   Applying this failure rate to our equation to 
determine our spare parts requirement we will use the following: 
P (protection level) is the Probability of having the part on hand when required in 
this case assumed to be .95 
K = 400 parts (2 per airplane) 
S = the number of spares to be determined 
R = reliability R = e-kλt 
LnR = natural log of R 
λ = .00025 failures per hour  
T = the stock replenishment cycle of 90 days or 3 months 
kλt= number of items X the failure rate X operating time per airplane X stocking 
intervals 
thus: 
kλt = 400(.00025)(30)(3)  or 400 parts operated 30 hours per month for 3 months  
at a failure rate of .00025 = 9 
To facilitate solving our equation we use the NAVSHIPS 94324 nomograph and enter 
the kλt value of 9 and refer to the P value of .95 and we get 14 spares are required. 
If we assume a protection level of .85, 10 spares are required  
Taking the demonstrated failure rate we solve our equation again.  According to the 
latest APML reliability figure of merit we have an MTBF of 138 hours for the TEF (Cdr. 
Ellen Coyne, NAVAIR, email 20 July 1999)  
Now, λ = 1/138 = .00722 per hour.  It follows that kλt = 400(.00722)(30)(3) = 259.9.  
Now we need ~ 300 spares.  We have a situation where the failure rate is 29 times that 
predicted and the spares on hand are ~ 1/20th that required. 
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The F/A-18 item manager states the TEF is presently performing at an MTBD of 900 
hours.  If we assume an inventory calculation substituting MTBD for MTBF we derive 
the following: 
λ = .0011 
kλt = 400(.0011)(30)(3) =  39.6 
As in the above procedure we have a failure rate 4.3 times predicted and we 
require 50 spares which is ~3.5 times predicted. 
The point here is that whichever reliability is correct, significant asymmetry exists. 
The asymmetry shown in this example is one of many that have impeded the F/A-18 
from achieving its inherent availability (Ai) since its introduction.  We have a pattern of 
failure rates that far exceed unsubstantiated levels that have been used to provision 
support for the F/A-18 and other systems resulting in under-budgeting logistics support, 
cannibalization and its costs, increased workload on maintenance personnel, potential 
safety risks and most significantly an operational readiness potential that is unrealized.  
Although we know that the demonstrated reliability is not what was predicted we have 
not recomputed the spares required and have not made the necessary provisioning 
corrections and investments.  Moreover we tend not to conduct a follow-on Level of 
Repair Analysis (LORA).   
How can we improve the establishment of reliability figures of merit for the purposes of 
spare inventory symmetry?  First, we should adopt a null hypothesis, which states that a 
claim of a reliability figure of merit for a given component is not true until proven by the 
contractor.  (The Navy should verify contractor MTBFs in a DT/OT continuum)  If the 
contractor’s initial claim cannot be established, then we next ask what value can be 
proved and is that value acceptable?  Once a value has been proved, then that is the 
value that should drive the spare inventory to support that given component.  
Our experience in Naval Aviation has shown that reliability declines over time, but our 
support analyses are not recomputed to match those changes.  It follows that logistics 
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managers and sustainment engineers should recompute support requirements in light of 
declining reliability and that budgets must be adjusted to support the derived 
requirements. 
We have the tools at our disposal to correct the asymmetry of reliability and spares 
inventories for our weapon systems.  We should strive for accuracy in establishing 
reliability measures for new programs.  In order to ensure we have the best measure of 
reliability, we should employ the Null Hypothesis that says the contractor must prove 
claims of performance and not the Navy. Once a figure of merit is demonstrated we 
must ensure the inventory matches the reliability.  Throughout the life of a system we 
should continuously analyze reliability performance and recompute spare parts 
inventories based on our analysis and finally we must make the financial commitment to 
make these efforts successful.  
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